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Article

Whoops, There Goes Washington:
Is California Next?

SAMUEL M. WITTEN*
BENNETT L. HECHT**

The decision of the Washington State Supreme Court in Chemical
Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply System' has sent shock
waves through the legal, municipal bond, and nuclear power communities. The court held that certain Washington cities and utility
districts acted ultra vires by entering into contracts with the Washington
Public Power Supply System (hereinafter referred to as "WPPSS").
These contracts obligated those cities and utility districts to pay for
nuclear power plant construction even if the plants would never be
completed. The decision of the court to invalidate these "take or pay"
contracts led to a $2.25 billion bond default, the largest bond default
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99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (Wash. 1983) [hereinafter "WPPSS"].
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in the history of this nation.' Similar take or pay agreements in California support over $1 billion in notes and bonds issued exclusively for
nuclear power plant construction. Consequently, the reasoning of the
Washington Supreme Court suggests the possibility that a similar
holding might invalidate existing bond agreements in California and
other states.' The purpose of this article is to determine whether

California courts will uphold or invalidate these bond agreements
following the rationale of the WPPSS court by analyzing the WPPSS
decision and examining the take or pay agreements in California."
Tim WPPSS
A.

DECISION

The Facts

WPPSS is a "joint operating agency" established in 1957 under
Revised Code of Washington section 43.52. The agency was created
to build generating facilities sufficient to meet the future power needs
of the participants. Nine Washington cities, nineteen Washington public
utility districts, and sixty other participants from six neighboring states
became members of WPPSS.1 By pooling their resources, WPPSS
members envisioned low utility charges through the use of economies
of scale in building power plants. The members also saw a way to
be assured of "cheap power" into the 21st century by using the new

2. New York Times, August 14, 1983, at Fl. "Take or pay" contracts are defined infra
note 13.
3. California, Connecticut and Minnesota are the states in which analysts are most interested. In these three states neither the state legislatures nor the state courts have ruled on
the validity of "take or pay" contracts. Telephone conversations with various attorneys at Mudge
Rose Guthrie and Alexander in New York, Counsel to public power agencies in Minnesota,
California and Connecticut and Austen, "Take or Pay Contracts," Drexel Burnham Lambert,
July 22, 1983. See also Memorandum of Connecticut Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative
(CMEEC), August 17, 1983 (CMEEC's bond counsel, financial adviser and underwriters are
in agreement that CMEEC operates a sound utility which is built on a firm legal and financial
foundation).
4. See Bond Offering Statements of Southern California Public Power Agency and Connecticut Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative. The Southern California Public Power Agency
(SCPPA) alone has $650,000,000 in bonds and $332,875,000 in notes outstanding that were
issued for the purchase of a portion of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Plant.
5. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 776, 666 P.2d at 332. Because the Washington Supreme Court
analyzed the "take or pay" contracts as a question of state delegation of power, only the
Washington members of WPPSS were implicated in the decision. Id. A joint action or operating
agency is formed when two or more public bodies, usually municipalities or utility districts
combine to gain economies of scale. Such agencies generally exist for the development of costly
generating facilities. See vAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §43.52.360 (1961) ("any two or more cities
or public utility districts or combinations thereof may form an operating agency for purpose
of acquiring, constructing, operating, and owning plants, systems, and other facilities for generation and/or transmission of electric energy powers").
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technology of nuclear energy.6
In the early 1970's, WPPSS issued $6.1 billion in public bonds to

finance construction of the first three nuclear generating facilities,
commonly referred to as Projects 1, 2, and 3.7 These projects were
not implicated in the WPPSS decision." In 1974, however, members
of the power industry predicted that the capacity from the first three
projects would not meet future energy needs. 9 With the unwaivering

support of previous WPPSS bonds by Wall Street investors, WPPSS
decided to issue more revenue bonds to obtain construction funds

for two more plants, Projects 4 and 5.10
Project 4 was to be owned entirely by WPPSS while Project 5 was
to be owned 90% by WPPSS and 10% by Pacific Power and Light
Company, a private utility." Unlike the bonds issued for Projects
1, 2, and 3, which had been guaranteed by an agency of the federal

government, the Bonneville Power Administration, bonds for these
two projects were guaranteed solely by agreements between WPPSS
and the participants. 2 These agreements, ultimately invalidated by the
court, are known as "take or pay" contracts. In essence, take or
pay contracts are unilateral and unconditional promises of performance made by participants in WPPSS. The contracts required WPPSS
participants to repay WPPSS for all plant construction costs on Projects 4 and 5 come "hell or high water," i.e., regardless of whether
the plants were ever completed. '3 Specifically, the agreements stated
that "such payments shall not be conditioned upon the performance
or non-performance by the Supply System [WPPSS]."' 4
In 1982, these contracts became the focus of considerable con6. Bernstein, A Nuclear Fiasco Shakes the Bond Market, FORTUNE, February 22, 1982,
at 102, col. 2.
7. New York Times, August 14, 1983, at Fl.
8. See WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 777, 666 P.2d at 332-33; see also infra note 12.
9. Bernstein, A Nuclear Fiasco Shakes the Bond Market, FORTUNE, February 22, 1982,
at 102, col. 2.
10. New York Times, August 14, 1983, at Fl.
11. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 777, 666 P.2d at 332-33.
12. Id. The Bonneville Power Administration, through a complex "net-billing" agreement,
retained all the risks of incompletion for Projects 1, 2 and 3. This guarantee was upheld in
Springfield v. Washington Public Power Supply System, Slip. Op. No 82-1387 (D.Or., April
27, 1983).
13. "Take or pay" (also called "hell or high water" or "dry hole" contracts) are unconditional pledges of revenues. These contracts were first devised by early constructors of gas
pipelines and have since become a standard part of large power-plant financing. They obligate
customers to "take" the products (in this case, electricity) as soon as it is produced but to
pay for it at a fixed pre-determined time irrespective of ultimate delivery of the product. Bernstein, supra note 6, at 103; Telephone interview with Mr. Charles Sullivan, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (October 19, 1983) and Austen, "Take or Pay Contracts," Drexel
Burnham Lambert, July 22, 1983.
14. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 777, 666 P.2d at 332.
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troversy. High inflation and gross mismanagement of plant construction by WPPSS led that agency to acknowledge that it no longer had
sufficient bond revenues to complete Projects 4 and 5.11 On January
22, 1982, construction was halted, leaving Project 4 twenty-four percent completed and Project 5 sixteen percent completed. Costs incurred at that point nearly reached the original total cost for completion
of both plants. With completion of either plant unlikely, the participants began breaching their take or pay agreements by withholding
their contractual periodic bond payments to WPPSS.' 6
Chemical Bank, as trustee for the bondholders,' 7 subsequently
brought an action in the Superior Court of Washington against WPPSS
and the participants. The bank sought a declaratory judgment that
the participants must pay their fair share of construction costs for
the two projects even though the plants might never be completed.
Although WPPSS itself agreed with the plaintiff, the WPPSS participants argued that they lacked the legal authority to enter into a
take or pay type of agreement."I The participants argued that as
creatures of the state of Washington, they could exercise only those
powers given to them by the state and that the state had never given
them the authority to contract to pay something for nothing.' 9 The
trial court ruled for Chemical Bank,2" upholding the obligation of
the participants under the take or pay contracts. On appeal, the
Washington Supreme Court reversed the lower court, considering only
whether the Washington public utility districts (hereinafter referred
to as "PUD's") and municipalities of Washington had the authority
to enter into these contracts. 2 '
B.

The Opinion of the Washington Supreme Court

The decision of the Washington Supreme Court was directed only
to the issue of whether the Washington Legislature had delegated the
authority to WPPSS participants to enter into contracts with take
or pay provisions. The court determined the scope of the participants'
authority by analyzing the express power to purchase electricity2 2 and
15.

Id. at 776, 666 P.2d at 331.

16.

Id.

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 779, 666 P.2d at 333.
20. Id. at 780, 666 P.2d at 333-34. The trial court held that the participants were obligated
to pay WPPSS their respective shares, whether or not the plants were completed and that WPPSS

and the participants had statutory authority to enter into such agreements. Id.
21.
22.

Id. at 781, 666 P.2d at 334.
See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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acquire electric generating facilities,23 and the implied powers to pay
for those services. 24 The court also evaluated the participants' powers

under joint operating" and development 26 statutes. As no authority
to enter a WPPSS-type contract was found under any of these analyses,
the court invalidated the WPPSS contracts.
1.

Express Powers

The court first noted that the participants in WPPSS had express

statutory authority to purchase electricity for the citizens in their
communities. 27 The participants also had the power to contract with

any operating agency or public utility for the purchase or sale of electric energy. 28 The court held, however, that WPPSS participants were

not buying or selling electricity but only "project capability,"2

9

or

the possibility of future power. An agreement that expressly provides

for payment even if no electricity is generated, did not qualify as
a "purchase" of electricity.3
Next, the court noted that the participants had the express power
to construct, acquire, and operate electric generating facilities.31 The
power to acquire power generating facilities (acquisition power) is

exercised validly only when participants retain either (1) an ownership interest in the project to be constructed,32 or (2) "sufficient control" over the project.33
The court held that the acquisition power of the participants could
not validate the WPPSS take or pay contracts because the participants
23. See infra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
27. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 782, 666 P.2d at 334. Washington public utility districts,
pursuant to W'VASHGTON REVISED CODE ANNOTATED section 54.16.040 (1961) have the power
to "purchase, within or without its limits, electric current for sale and distribution within or

without its limits." Municipalities, whether first class cities or code cities, have this authority
under the similar language (a first class city had the power to "provide for lighting . . . and
for furnishing the inhabitants of the city with gas, electric, or other lights..." WPPSS, 99
Wash. 2d at 782, 666 P.2d at 335.
28. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 783, 666 P.2d at 335.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 784, 666 P.2d at 335. WASHINGTON REVISED CODE ANNOTATED section 35.92.050
(1961) authorizes a city or town "to construct, condemn and purchase, purchase, acquire, add
to, maintain and operate works . . .for the purpose of furnishing .. . inhabitants. . . with
. . . electricity . . . with full authority to regulate and control the use, distribution and price
thereof . . . authorize the construction of such plant . . . and purchase gas, electricity, or
power from either within or without the city. . . ." See also WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §54.16.040
(1961) (almost identical language giving PUD's express authority to do the same).
32. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 785, 666 P.2d at 336.
33. Id. at 787, 666 P.2d at 337.
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had only contracted to buy a share of project capability from WPPSS
and acquired no actual ownership interest in the projects.14 The WPPSS
Participant Agreements expressly provided that only WPPSS itself (as
distinguished from the participants) and the Pacific Power and Light
Company retained ownership interests in the Project."
The court then faced the issue of whether the participants had retained "sufficient control" over the projects to uphold the take or
pay contracts. 36 In light of the enormous risk posed to ratepayers
by take or pay contracts, the court believed that WPPSS participants
must retain sufficient control over the projects, equivalent to an ownership interest, to uphold the validity of the contracts. Only through
7
this control, could participants minimize the risks to utility ratepayers.
The court evaluated the "sufficient control" issue by analyzing the
participants committee within the WPPSS organization and comparing the control held by WPPSS participants to the control required
in previous decisions of Washington courts upholding acquisitions
under joint operating agreements. The court found insignificant the
3
control retained by participants through the participants committee. 1
Although the agreements between WPPSS and the participants required a committee meeting to approve or disapprove major decisions concerning the projects, the court found that the procedure for
committee consideration of WPPSS proposals precluded meaningful
deliberation by the committee. 39 In effect, the participants committee
acted as a "rubber stamp" of WPPSS decisions."
The court specifically emphasized the necessity and propriety of
representative management committees in joint operating agencies such
as WPPSS. For these bodies to warrant the upholding of acquisitions by joint operating agencies, however, they must allow participating members to exercise significant control over the projects. 4
34. Id.
35. Id. at 785, 666 P.2d at 337. The court noted that an ownership interest would not
be necessary if the legislature had explicitly authorized "take or pay" provisions. Id. Although
some states have expressly allowed unconditional guarantee clauses, e.g., South Carolina,
Massachusetts and Maine, the court emphasized that Washington has no such statute.
36. Id. "Sufficient control" was considered synonymous with "substantial management
control." Id.
37. Id. at 787, 666 P.2d at 337.
38. Id. The court objected to the procedure that requires 20% of the participants to register
their disapproval of any WPPSS proposal within 15 days or the proposal would be approved.
The court felt that given the complexity of problems and the part-time make up of the Committee, such as rigid procedures precluded any "significant input to the management of the
projects." Id.
39. Id. at 788, 666 P.2d at 337.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 788-89, 666 P.2d at 337-38.
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The court cited its decision in Roehl v. PUD, 2 a case that also involved the joint development and management of a generating project. In Roehl, five public utility districts attempted to acquire the

generating facilities of Puget Sound Power and Light under a joint
development agreement.1 3 The court upheld the agreement in Roehl

because control over the project was exercised by an executive board
consisting of one member of each utility. This board was responsible

for the overall management of the project. The WPPSS court found
that the "same degree of participant control is not present [here]

because most of the policy decisions and management control are
delegated to WPPSS. '4 4
The WPPSS court also implied that the participants acted ultra vires

5
because the scope of authority wielded by WPPSS was excessive.1

Citing State ex rel. PUD 1 v. Wylie,4 6 the court noted that "even the ex-

press power to buy and sell electricity or to acquire or construct
generating facilities may not be exercised in a manner beyond the
scope of that primary purpose or such a project would be ultra vires." ' 7
The Washington Supreme Court was thus unable to uphold the take

or pay provisions under any express delegation of authority from the
state legislature to WPPSS participants.
2. Implied Powers
The WPPSS court also held that the participants lacked implied
power to enter into take or pay agreements. 8 The plaintiffs urged

the court to follow the logic of Metro Seattle v. Seattle,4 9 which held
that when a utility district or a municipality has the power to provide

utility services, "there is implied power to pay for it.' ' 50 The trial
court below had taken the holding of the Metro case to mean that
42. 43 Wash. 2d 214, 261 P.2d 92 (1953). In addition to case law, the court cited WAsHINGTON REviSED CODE ANNoTATED section 54.16.040 (1961) (Public utility districts) and §35.92.050
(1961) (cities). Both statutes provide that cities and PUD's have "full and exclusive authority
to sell and regulate and control the use, distribution, rates, service, charges and price thereof.
• WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 788-89, 666 P.2d at 337-38.
43. 43 Wash. 2d 237, 261 P.2d at 99; WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 790, 666 P.2d at 338-39.
44. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 790, 666 P.2d at 339. The court also cited State ex. reL
PUD 1 v. Schwab, 40 Wash. 2d 814, 264 P.2d 1081 (1950). In Schwab the Washington Supreme
Court upheld a PUD's ability to acquire plants for future power needs. The PUD in Schwab.
however, retained all ownership interests in the facility as well as management and control
of the project.
45.
WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 790, 666 P.2d at 338.
46. 28 Wash. 2d 113, 182 P.2d 706 (1947).
47. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d, at 789, 666 P.2d at 338.
48. Id.
49. 57 Wash. 2d 446, 357 P.2d 863 (1960).
50. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 791, 666 P.2d at 339.

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 15

the implied power to pay for a power plant also included the power
to make financing arrangements such as the WPPSS Participant Agreements. " The Washington Supreme Court easily distinguished Metro,
since that case did not have agreements containing take or pay provisions. In Metro, the City of Seattle undertook to pay for sewage services as they were provided. Metro thus involved a pledge conditioned
on the receipt of services, not the unconditional promises contained
in the WPPSS agreements. 2
The court also emphasized that the relevant case law did not support a finding that broad implied powers have been delegated to
municipalities and utility districts, including those entities with broad
home rule powers.53 The WPPSS court noted that the home rule
powers of a Washington municipal corporation have been carefully
limited by the legislature to powers expressly conferred or necessarily
implied.5" If the legislature has not expressly or impliedly authorized
the specific action in question, in this case the "take or pay" contracts of WPPSS members, then the action must be held invalid."
Thus the WPPSS court concluded that "at least where the interest
of the State is paramount to or joint with that of the municipal corporation," the municipal corporation has no power to act outside
of the delegation of authority from the legislature. 6 The court found
that the joint efforts of the WPPSS participants were a subject of
state as well as local interest.5 7 The state interest demanded that a
municipality have either an express or implied delegation of authority.
Since neither power existed, the agreements were invalid and could
not stand.

51.
52.

Id.
Id.

53. Id. at 789-91, 666 P.2d 334-40. Washington courts have narrowly interpreted home rule
powers of Washington municipalities. They have limited home rule entities to their express

powers in the same way as general law cities are so limited. Id. In many jurisdictions, states
have conferred home rule powers onto municipal units. These units are given broad powers
to legislate in any area not preempted by the state, even if the state has not expressly given
the unit the power to so act. For example, a home rule city will have exentsive implied powers while

a non-home rule city (also called a general law city) will be limited to those powers expressly
given to it by the state or those necessarily implied in order for it to carry out its governmental
function. See generally VALEiaNT, LocAL GoVERmENT LAw, 107-09, (1980).
54. 99 Wash. 2d at 793, 666 P.2d at 339, 340. See Trautman, Legislative Control of
Municipal Corporations in Washington, 38 WAsH. L. REV. 743, 772 (1963).
55. Id.; see Hillis Homes Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 808, 650 P.2d

193, 195 (1982) (if any doubt about a city's claimed grant of power, it must be denied).
56.

WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 793, 666 P.2d at 340.

57. The court stated that the state is vitally interested in the diverse municipal powers
that might be employed in this type of project. Id.
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3.

Joint Operating Agreements

The WPPSS court then analyzed the state statutes covering joint
operating agreements5 8 to determine if take or pay contracts could
be upheld under those provisions. Revised Code of Washington section 43.52.410 allows any city or district to enter into contracts or
compacts with any operating agency, such as WPPSS, for the purchase and sale of electricity59 and a similar statute also gives an
operating agency authority to enter into contracts with local government units.60 The'court found these statutes inapposite because they
explicitly allowed only for the purchase of electricity, and not for
the purchase of only a potentialshare of electricity. The WPPSS court,
therefore, found no basis for the participants' authority under the
joint operating agreements statutes. 6'
4.

Joint Development Agreements

Finally, the court analyzed the participants' scope of authority under
the state electric power joint development statute. 62 This statute
delineates the authority of cities and public utility districts to participate jointly in the development of power facilities as a means of
achieving economies of scale and thus meeting the power needs of
the state. The court held that the ioint development statute was inapplicable because the participants failed to retain a sufficient ownership interest in the works6 3 and because they were not responsible
for more than merely their own debts and obligations in connection
with the WPPSS facilities.6 Citing Public Utility District No. 1 of
Snohomish County v. Taxpayers and Ratepayers of Snohomish
County, 65 the court held that to withstand scrutiny under a joint
development statute, the participants must retain an ownership interest in their facilities and limit their own liability to their proportionate participation in the program. 6 Because these standards were
58.
59.

WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §§43.52.250-.910 (1961).
Id. §43.52.410 (1961).

60. Id. §43.52.391 (1961) (operating agency may make contracts for any term relating to
the purchase of power.., and may purchase or deliver power anywhere pursuant to contract).
61. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 794, 666 P.2d at 341.
62. WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 54.44.010-.910 (1967).
63. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 795, 666 P.2d at 341.
64. Id. at 797, 666 P.2d at 341-42; WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §54.44.030 (1961) (In carrying
out the powers granted in this chapter, each city . . . shall be severally liable only for its
own acts and not jointly or severally liable for the acts . . . of others).
65. 78 Wash. 2d 724, 479 P.2d 61 (1971).
66. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 797, 666 P.2d at 342.
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not complied with in WPPSS, the joint development agreement statute
was not adequate authority to uphold the take or pay provisions in
the participant agreement.
TrE EFFECTS OF THE WPPSS DECISION

In essence, the WPPSS decision turned on equitable issues. Unsuspecting ratepayers guaranteed bond payments regardless of plant completion, surrendered ownership interest and control to WPPSS, and
agreed to assume potentially astronomical obligations of defaulting
participants.6 7 The same issue of delegation of power that governed
the WPPSS decision in Washington may be relevant in states that
have not yet ruled on the validity of take or pay clauses in contracts
financing the construction of nuclear power plants. 8 Particularly in
the state of California, where nuclear plant construction costs are skyrocketing and anti-nuclear sentiment has been recently aroused over
the Diablo Canyon power plant, 69 a challenge patterned after the
WPPSS decision is foreseeable.
California and Washington present almost identical factual situations. California public power agencies, known as joint action agencies, contract with participants using take or pay agreements.70
Although no challenge to these agreements has been brought to date,
this article will now focus on California law and speculate as to whether
the analogous financing arrangements secured by participant take or
pay agreements will be upheld if challenged in California.
California has outstanding obligations of $1,620,000,000 in longterm bonds and $332,875,000 in two year short-term notes, both of
which are backed by some type of take or pay provision. 7' The reliance

67. Id. at 798, 666 P.2d at 343. The WPPSS court stated that if they had upheld the
Participant Agreements, participants (and ratepaying consumers) collectively could have ended
up paying $7 billion for nuclear plants which would never generate electricity. Id. at 777, 666
P.2d at 332.
68. See supra note 3.
69. N.Y. Times, September 29, 1981, at 8, col. 3 (Protestors arrested at Diablo Canyon
Nuclear Power Plant).
70. Connecticut and Minnesota joint action agencies do not use these clauses with participant members but have themselves agreed to include take or pay provisions in purchase agreements
with other utilities, both public and private (e.g., a Connecticut agency will contract with another
utility company for energy supplies because it cannot meet all the needs of its participants
with its own facilities). Whether take or pay contracts between a public power agency and
non-participating parties are subject to the same scrutiny as participant agreement (as in WPPSS)
has yet to be determined. Telephone interview with Robert Naylor, Executive Assistant, Connecticut Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative and Dave Loer, MinnCoda Power Cooperative.
October 12, 1983.
71. MSR Public Power Agency has $215,000,000 of bonds outstanding which are supported by Public Service of New Mexico's agreement to take or pay for power generated from
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of Southern California Public Power Agency (hereinafter referred to
as "SCPPA") on nuclear power and take or pay agreements with
participants so closely resembles the WPPSS arrangement that this
article will consider the outcome of a WPPSS-like challenge in California based on the composition of SCPPA and the authority expressly
or impliedly granted to SCPPA participants by the California
Legislature.
THE

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC POWER AGENCY

The Southern California Public Power Agency is comprised of nine
cities and one irrigation district." Each city of SCPPA is also the
owner of a local utility." A city that owns a utility is a very different
creature of state law from an irrigation district. The two are treated
quite differently by the California Legislature and the courts. If a
city or town supplies its inhabitants with water, light, and power,
the utility is considered "municipally owned." 7 4 Municipally owned
utilities are generally managed by a city administrator or employee
who is responsible to the mayor and the city council. An irrigation
district, on the other hand, is established by citizens of a county who
decide to combine their resources for a very limited purpose, generally to supply themselves with sewer, water, or power services. An
irrigation district is run by an elected Board of Directors." Each director represents a specific area of the district and stands for re-election
periodically. The director is responsible only to his or her constituents
76
and does not report to any other governing body or elected official.
Each SCPPA participant has entered into a Power Sales Agreement with SCPPA in which the participants agree to make payments
according to take or pay provisions" that are almost identical to the

coal. Northern California Public Power Agency has $55,000,000 of bonds outstanding, guaranteed
by participant take or pay contracts for geothermal energy. Kings River Conservation District
has bonds of $700,000,000 supported by take or pay agreements with California Department
of Water Resources for hydroelectric power. Finally, Southern California Public Power Agency
has $650,000,000 outstanding in bonds and $332,875,000 in notes which are secured by participant take or pay agreements. SCPPA power is 100% nuclear. Austen, "Take or Pay Contracts", Drexel Burnham Lambert, at 2-3 (July 22, 1983).
72. SCPPA Bond Anticipation Notes Offering Statement, July 15, 1983, at 22. The member
cities are Riverside, Vernon, Burbank, Glendale, Pasadena, Azusa, Banning, Colton and the
City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. The irrigation district is the Imperial
Irrigation District.
73. Id.
74. See generally CAL. PuB. UTM. CODE §§10001-10006.
75. See generally CAL. WATER CODF §§20500-21550.
76. Id.
77. SCPPA Bond Anticipation Notes Offering Statement at 9.
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clauses in the WPPSS agreements. 78 The Sales Agreements also contain provisions concerning the termination of the project" and the
obligations of each participant under the bond indenture. 0
Like WPPSS, SCPPA was formed by a joint agreement for the
"purpose of planning, financing, developing, acquiring, constructing,
operating and maintaining projects for the generation or transmission of electric energy."' The Agency is governed by a Board of
Directors consisting of one representative for each member.82 Each
director is entitled, however, to cast votes proportionate to the amount
of electricity to be consumed by their organizations.8 3 SCPPA has
issued bonds and notes " to finance the purchase of a portion of the
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3. Unit 1 was
scheduled to begin operation by 1984, Unit 2 in late 1984, and Unit
3 in 1986.5 Those projected operating dates, however, were based
on the assumption that no additional delays in construction would
occur. On July 29, 1983, internal damage to the cooling system in
Unit 1 was discovered and the operating schedule for that unit has
been postponed indefinitely."
Assuming there is a challenge to the Power Sales Agreements that
SCPPA has with participating cities and the irrigation district, the
California Supreme Court would quite possibly take the same approach
used by the WPPSS court. The court would review the express or
implied authority under state law of the SCPPA participants to purchase power and acquire or construct facilities with take or pay contracts. Moreover, the California Supreme Court would also consider
whether state joint operating or joint developing statutes similar to
the Washington statute examined by the WPPSS court would be sufficient to uphold such contracts.
78. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. The SCPAA clauses read "[w]hether
or not the authority interest or any part thereof is operating or operable (or has been completed) .. .such payments shall not be subject to reduction whether by offset or otherwise
and shall not be conditional upon performance or non-performance by any party. . ." SCPAA
Bond Anticipation Notes Offering Statement at 9.

79.

See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.

80.
81.
82.
83.

See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
SCPPA Bond Anticipation Notes Offering Statement at 12.
Id. at 13.
Votes are in direct relationship to cost and entitlement shares of power to be generated.

Presently, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power has a 67% share, Imperial Irrigation
6.5%, Riverside 5.4%, Vernon 4.9%, Burbank, Glendale and Pasadena 4.4% each, and Azusa,
Banning and Colton 1.0% each. Id. at 22.
84. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
85. SCPPA Board Anticipation Notes Offering Statement at 16.
86. Id.
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A.

Express Powers

Under California law, all SCPPA participants have the power to
purchase and sell electricity.8 7 As in Washington, however, this express
authority is silent on the power to purchase "project capability" or
the possibility of future power. Following the WPPSS rationale that
an agreement providing for payment even if no electricity is actually
generated does not qualify as a "purchase" of electricity, the California
Supreme Court would probably strike down take or pay clauses based
on the statutory power to purchase electricity. 8
As in WPPSS, all of the SCPPA participants are granted statutory
authority to acquire or construct generating facilities.8 9 Under the
WPPSS analysis, however, this power alone was insufficient to uphold
take or pay clauses. Following the Washington court's analysis, the
California court may determine whether the acquisition power has
been validly exercised by determining whether the participants are required to retain an ownership interest in, or sufficient control over,
the construction project, and whether the SCPPA participants have
actually retained the requisite control."
Municipalities that own their own utilities (nine of the ten SCPPA
participants) are responsible for acquiring and controlling those
facilities. California Public Utility Code section 10003 describes the
scope of a municipality's acquisition powers:
The power to acquire and operate a public utility includes the power
to complete, reconstruct, extend, enlarge ... a public utility .... 91
This provision seems to require that whenever the acquisition power
is exercised by a local government, operation of the facility by that
92
government must follow.
87. The nine cities own their own utilities and have the power to acquire or operate any
"public utility." A "public utility" is anything established to "supply a municipal corporation
alone or together wth its inhabitants or any portion thereof with... light." CAL. PuB. UTm.
CODE §10001. Imperial Irrigation, the irrigation district, has virtually the same powers. It has
the power to "purchase or lease electric power . . . and provide for [the] sale and lease of
electric power." CAL. WATER CODE §22115.
88. Compare supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
89. CAL. PuB. Urn. Code §10002 (Any municipal corporation may acquire, construct,
own, operate or lease any public utility); CAL. WATER CODE §22115 (any irrigation district
may provide for the acquisition, leasing and control of plants for generation, transmission distribution, sale and lease of electric power).
90. Compare supra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
91. CAL. PuB. UTm. CODE §10003 (emphasis added).
92. Compare CAL. PuB. Una. CODE §12801 with id. §10003. Section 12801 describes the
acquisition powers of a municipal utility district (MUD), an entity that is totally unrelated
to a municipally owned utility. A MUD may "acquire, construct, own, operate, control or
use generating facilities .... ." Unlike the acquisition powers of a municipally owned utility,
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Irrigation districts, like SCPPA participant Imperial Irrigation
District, also need to retain an ownership interest after acquiring a
public utility. The statutory provisions that permit an irrigation district
to acquire facilities also imply that a district must retain control over
the utility's operations:
Any district ... may provide for the acquisition, operation, leasing
and control of plants for the generation, sale and lease of electric
power.

93

Other code provisions imply that the legislature intended irrigation
districts to control their facilities. Section 22118 states that an irrigation district will undertake necessary and proper acts for the construction and operation of its electric power works94 and section 25656
provides that the board of an irrigation district is responsible for setting rates that will insure that such facilities will be self-sustaining. 9
These restrictive statutory provisions indicate that the legislature intended irrigation districts to be responsible for their own utilities.
1.

Retention of An Ownership Interest

The California court thus may require SCPPA participants to retain an ownership interest in the projects operated by SCPPA. SCPPA
has applied its bond revenues to purchase an interest in the Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Stations 1, 2, and 3, and to acquire the right
to use certain portions of the Arizona Nuclear Power Project Transmission System.9" SCPPA has a 5.91% ownership interest in the generating
stations, but has no ownership interest in the transmission system. 97
Furthermore, pursuant to an agreement with Arizona Public Services
(hereinafter referred to as APS), APS will be responsible for operating
and maintaining both the stations and the transmission system. 98 The
SCPPA participants thus, have no significant ownership interest in
these projects.
however, the legislature has not limited a MUD's powers by defining the scope of such authority.
(See §10003, Scope of the powers of a municipally owned utility, supra text accompanying
note 90). The decision of the legislature to define the powers of a municipally owned utility

(and not the powers of a MUD) and its description of this authority as "the power to acquire
and operate" indicates that the legislature intended a city acquiring a power plant to maintain
managerial control over the facility as well.
93. CAL. WATER CODE §22115 (emphasis supplied).
94. Id. §22118 (emphasis supplied).
95. Id. §25656(b) (the board shall fix such charges for commodities or service furnished

by any revenue producing utility as will pay all of the expenses of the government of the district).
96. SCPPA Bond Anticipation Notes Offering Statement at 2.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
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2.

Maintaining "Sufficient Control" Over The Projects

Under the WPPSS rationale, if no ownership share in the projects
exist, then sufficient control over the power plant projects is required. 9
The WPPSS court held that sufficient control can exist even though
participants do not exercise control directly, but act through an executive committee. This committee, however, must be responsible for
overall management and allow participants a voice in the decisions
made by the power supply organization, WPPSS in Washington or
SCPPA in California. 0 0
The SCPPA Board does not meet the requirements enunciated by
the WPPSS court. Although the Board consists of one representative
for each of the participating members,' each representative's vote
does not carry the same weight. A Director is entitled to cast votes
weighted according to the size of the entitlement that is represented.' 0 2
For example, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (the
Department) and the City of Colton each have a member on the Board.
The Department representative, however, has sixty-seven votes while
the Colton representative has only one." 3 Although all matters before
the Board must be decided by 80% of the votes cast and no vote
can occur unless Directors making up more than 50% of the votes
are present,0 4 it is clear that the Department will always prevail. The
other participants, even voting as a block, cannot exercise control
over SCPPA. SCPPA committee procedures thus appear to confer
even less power on participating members than was allowed under
WPPSS procedures.
B.

Implied Powers
1.

Municipally Owned Utilities

Of the nine municipally owned utilities in SCPPA, six are charter
cities under California law. The City of Los Angeles, which controls
the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and the cities of
Riverside, Vernon, Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena are all charter

99.
100.
101.

See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
Id.
This was one factor supporting "sufficient control" in the eyes of the WPPSS court.

See supra note 7.
102. SCPPA Bond Anticipation Notes Offering Statement at 13. For entitlement shares,
see supra note 83.
103. SCPPA Bond Anticipation Notes Offering Statement at 22; see supra note 83.
104. Id. at 13.
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cities. The cities of Azusa, Banning, and Colton are considered general
law cities.' 5
General law cities have only those powers given to them by the
legislature. Under California law, grants of power to general law cities
are strictly construed and any doubts are resolved against the power
claimed.' 6 Charter cities, on the other hand, are treated differently.
California law confers broad power and discretion to charter cities,
especially when they are conducting municipal affairs. The California Constitution provides:
cities and towns hereafter organized under charters ... are hereby
empowered . . . to make and enforce all laws and regulations in
respect to municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations provided by their charters and in respect to other matters they
shall be subject to and controlled by general laws.' 0 7
The powers of a charter city are limited only if laws enacted by
the city conflict with a state law of California or an expressly stated
purpose.'0 8 In essence, if the state has already spoken, local law will
be invalid, but when the state has not spoken, the municipalities are
given a free hand.10 9
A California court of appeal has stated that the implied powers
of a charter city include management of electric power. The court
held that the sale and distribution of electrical energy is a "municipal
affair" over which local governments have great discretion." 0 Under
a WPPSS analysis, the take or pay contracts between the six charter
cities and SCPPA, therefore, would probably be upheld because the
SCPPA Power Sales Agreements concern the sale and distribution
of electricity, a matter of local concern.
105. Telephone conversation with Lydia Levin, Associate, Rourke and Woodruff, Counsel
to SCPPA, Santa Ana, California (November 18, 1983).
106. Los Angeles Flood Control District v. Southern California Edison Co., 51 Cal. 2d
331, 338, 333 P.2d 1, 5 (1958).
107. CAL. CONST. art. IX, §6. (emphasis added). See Taylor v. Crane, 595 P.2d 129, 134,
155 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1979) (city charter is construed to permit exercise of powers not expressly
limited by charter or by superior state or federal law); Medford v. City of Tulare, 102 Cal.
App. 2d 910, 228 P.2d 847, 850 (Cal. 1951) (in respect to municipal affairs, city is not subject
to general law except as the charter may provide). See also Foundation for San Francisco's
Architectural Heritage v. City and County of San Francisco, 106 Cal. App. 3d 893, 906 (1980);
Bayless v. Limber, 26 Cal. App. 3d 463, 469, 102 Cal. Rptr. 647, 650 (1972).
108. Cunningham v. Hart, 80 Cal. App. 2d 902, 183 P.2d 75, (1947) (where matter is statewide
concern, a state law may control provisions of municipal charter on same subject).
109. John Tennant Memorial Homes v. City of Pacific Grove, 27 Cal. App. 3d 372, 384,
103 Cal. Rptr. 215, 223 (1972).
110. Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corp. v. the City of Los Angeles, 188 Cal. 307, 318-20
(1922) (court upheld a challenge to a contract between Los Angeles and private electric companies for distribution of the city's surplus electricity); In re Bonds of Orosi Public Utility
District, 196 Cal. 43, 57, 235 P. 1004, 1010 (1925) (public service activities, such as sale and
distribution of electrical energy are municipal affairs).
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The sweeping incidental powers granted to municipalities under
California Public Utilities Code section 10004 augment the implied
powers granted to charter cities. Section 10004 states that a municipality
has the power to "acquire, own, control, sell or exchange ... rights
of every nature within or without its corporate limits.""' A strong
argument can be made that "rights of every nature" includes the
"capacity rights" in the Palo Verde nuclear power plant. Although
this argument alone may not necessarily be enough to validate the
take or pay provisions in question, the combination of this power
and the charter city's broad implied powers would seem to be sufficient to create implied authority to enter into the SCPPA take or
pay agreements. Finally, the legislature has not expressly forbidden
charter cities to enter into these types of contracts. Thus, the actions
of charter cities in joining SCPPA do not explicitly conflict with any
state law. Although it is likely that the California Supreme Court
would not uphold the take or pay contracts of the general law city
participants of SCPPA based on their very limited implied powers," 2
the court would probably allow these provisions for charter city participants because of (1) the broad powers of the cities, both express
and implied, over municipal affairs, and (2) the failure of the legislature
to prohibit cities from entering into take or pay agreements.
2.

Irrigation Districts

The implied powers of irrigation districts are much less extensive
than the powers of charter cities. Although irrigation districts have
sometimes been characterized as municipal corporations," 3 due to their
nature as districts with a specific, limited purpose, they lack broad
general charter city powers. ' In People ex. rel. Jones v. Cardiff
Irrigation District"5 the California Supreme Court stated that the

111. CAL. PuB. Urn. CODE §10004 reads in full:
Incidental Powers. For the purpose set forth in 10002 and 10003, a municipal corporation may acquire, own, control, sell or exchange lands, easements, licenses and
rights of every naturewithin or without its corporate limits, and may operate a public
utility within or without the corporate limits when necessary to supply the municipality
or its inhabitants or any portion thereof with the service desired (emphasis added).
112. Cf. supra note 106 and accompanying text.
113. Glenbrook Development Co. v. City of Brea, 61 Cal. Rptr. 189, 194 (1967) (term
"municipal corporation" as used in art. XI, §19 of Constitution embraces entities other than
cities and includes irrigation districts). A municipal corporation is simply any corporate body
consisting of inhabitants of a designed area created by the legislature with or without consent
of those inhabitants. BLACK's LAw DIcTIoNARY, 917 (5th ed. 1979).
114. CAL. CONsT. art. XI, §6. Only cities and towns organized under charters can be granted
broad charter city powers, not all "municipal corporations."
115. 197 P. 384, 51 Cal. App. 307 (1921).
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powers of an irrigation district are more limited than the powers of
other municipal organizations. 1 6 California courts have interpreted
the powers of an irrigation district in the narrowest possible way stating
that the districts have "only those powers expressly provided or
necessarily implied."" 7 Specifically, the courts have invoked "Dillon's
Rule," which limits the powers of a municipal corporation to those
(1) expressly granted, (2) necessarily implied by express powers, or
(3) essential to the achievement of a declared objective; any doubt
concerning the validity of power is to be construed against the
municipal corporation." 8 Thus, it appears that irrigation districts do
not enjoy implied powers broad enough to sustain take or pay
agreements.
C. Joint Operating Statute
The joint operating statute in California is similar to the one
analyzed by the WPPSS court. The California statute" 9 expressly
allows for the creation of SCPPA, and also determines the composition of the power agency.' California Government Code section 6545,
like the Washington statute, implies that SCPPA may enter into contracts for project capacity, and agencies may issue revenue bonds to
pay the cost of any capacity rights in the facility.'21 Under the WPPSS
reasoning, however, this power is not enough because the statute is
silent on the power of the participants to purchase electricity that
may not be actually generated and that cannot be classified as a purchase of electric energy. The WPPSS court stated:
If WPPSS were simply selling the electric energy, the participants
obviously would be authorized to buy it. However, since the terms
of the agreement encompass only a potential share to be generated,
it is not accurate to analyze participants' authority in terms of purchasing electric energy. Since the statutes do not provide for the
purchase of electric energy that may not be generated, we can discern
116. Id. at 385-86, 51 Cal. App. at 308.
117. Bottoms v. Madera Irrigation District, 74 Cal. App. 681, 694-95, 242 P. 100, 103 (1925).
118. DILLON, MUIrCIPAL CORPORATIONS, §237 (89) (5th Edition 1911). See VALENTE, supra
note 53, at 75-76. Other California case law further supports the findings of the Bottoms court.
See Harden v. Superior Court in and for Alameda County, 44 Cal. 2d 630, 638-39, 284 P.
2d 9, 14-15 (1944) (endorsing Dillon's Rule for non-charter city "municipal corporations");
Los Angeles Flood District v. Southern California Edison, 51 Cal. 2d 331, 335-36, 333 P.2d
1, 3 (1958) (grants of power to non-charter city municipal corporations are to be strictly constrned and any doubts resolved against power claimed).
119. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§6500-6546.
120. Id. §6508 authorizes joint power agency governance by committee and allows elected
members of that governing body to be elected in any ratio agreed to by parties.
121. Id. §6545.
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no basis for the participants authority in RCW 43.52 (Joint Operating
Agreements).' 22

Although California does not have a joint development statute, the
liability questions raised by the WPPSS court would still be relevant.
In WPPSS, the participants were jointly and severally liable for the
indebtedness of WPPSS. The unlimited liability played an important
part in the decision of the WPPSS court, since the tax payers were
left unprotected and subject to increased liabilities.' 23
The agreements between SCPPA and its members do not create
joint and several liability on the part of the participants.' 4 However,
the failure of a participant to make payments when due "may result
in larger payments by other participants in subsequent periods so the
Agency can pay

. . .

costs.""'2 Although the Power Sales Contracts

explicitly limit liability, this limit seems fictitious because SCPPA retains the right to amend the annual budget and increase participant
billings to cover any deficiencies. The participants are obligated to
pay these amended billings. Although a participant would be liable
only for its respective entitlement share of the debt service if the
Agency terminated a project,' 26 anything less than termination is a
"dry hole." Participants face seemingly endless liability.
CONCLUSION

The Washington State Supreme Court analyzed the issue in WPPSS
as a question of the delegation of power to WPPSS participants by
the State of Washington. The court held that the express and implied
delegation of state power to the WPPSS participants to purchase electricity, acquire or construct facilities, and enter into joint operating
or development agreements was insufficient to uphold the take or pay
agreements. The court therefore invalidated the agreements of the participants in WPPSS.
The California Supreme Court, following a similar approach when
called upon to analyze Southern California Public Power Agency participation agreements, might be persuaded by the decision of the
Washington court to invalidate some of the agreements. The statutory
power to purchase electricity granted to SCPPA participants does not
expressly authorize take or pay provisions. Furthermore, California
122. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 791, 666 P.2d at 340. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
123. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 797, 666 P.2d at 342-43.
124. SCPPA Bond Anticipation Notes Offering Statement at 9.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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law concerning municipally owned utilities (nine of the ten SCPPA
participants) and irrigation districts (one of the SCPPA participants)
supports the reasoning of the WPPSS court that an ownership interest or "sufficient control" must accompany the exercise of the power
to acquire and construct generating facilities. Because the municipallyowned utilities and the irrigation district neither retain an ownership
interest in SCPPA's project nor exercise "sufficient control" of
SCPPA's Executive Board, they cannot use their "acquisition" powers
to unconditionally pledge their revenues.
California law, however, does imply broad powers to charter cities,
which constitute six of the ten participants in WPPSS. Because of
these broad powers, the take or pay provisions in the contracts entered
into by the six charter city SCPPA members and SCPPA would probably be upheld. The implied powers of the four non-charter city
members (three general law cities and one irrigation district), however,
are not extensive enough to support their entering into take or pay
contracts.
Non-charter city members can find no support for their commitments
under joint operating or development statutes. Joint operating statutes
do not expressly provide for take or pay contracts and the failure
of SCPPA Power Sales Contracts to limit participating members'
liability also cuts sharply against take or pay provisions for equitable
reasons.
Therefore, the California Supreme Court is likely to uphold the
take or pay provisions in the Power Sales Contracts for six of SCPPA's
ten members, the municipally owned utilities controlled by the charter
cities of Los Angeles, Riverside, Vernon, Burbank, Glendale, and
Pasadena. Because these members are responsible for 90.5% of
SCPPA's outstanding debt,'" failure of the California Supreme Court
to uphold the take or pay provisions of the other four SCPPA
members would not materially jeopardize the Agency's activities.
Finally, it is arguable that the political setting of the WPPSS decision is relevant.' 8 The justices of the Washington Supreme Court
must stand for re-election every six years.' 29 Consequently, the
Washington court may have been more sensitive to the political
ramifications of their decision than the justices on the California

127. The six charter cities have assumed 90.5% of the SCPPA liability. Los Angeles Department of Water and Power is responsible for 67%, Riverside 5.4%, Vernon 4.9%, Burbank,
Glendale and Pasadena 4.4% each. Id. at 22.
128. Christian Science Monitor, June 20, 1983, at 10.
VAsH. CoNsT. art. IV, §3.
129.
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Supreme Court. 130 A judgment for WPPSS in Washington would have
been politically unpopular because it would have forced the
municipalities to comply with their contracts and pay for failed WPPSS
projects. The municipalities would then have had to pass the increased
costs on to utility ratepayers. The California court is somewhat more
insulated from the electorate and might vote more freely to uphold
a greater state interest in the future supply of energy and the continuation of SCPPA in its present form.

130. See CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, §16 (Supreme Court Justices elected by state voters to a 12
year term after nominations or appointment by governor).
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